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• ROS-M Features and Vulnerabilities 
• Mitigations for Security Vulnerabilities 
• Ongoing and Future Work 
2 
Introduction: FY16 Research 
3 
NPS ARSENL Swarm as test case 
Introduction: ROS 
• ROS: Robot Operating System 
– Maintained by the non-profit Open Source Robotics 
Foundation (OSRF) 
– Provides a framework and set of open source tools to help 
develop and test robotic applications 
– ROS 2.0 developed in 2014 to extend ROS to military 
robotics  
– ROS-Military (ROS-M) architecture needed to address 




• ROS-M is a defined open architecture from ROS 2.0 
– Quality and reliability for all ROS-M components 
• ROS-M development underway 




ROS-M: Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities 
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ROS Military-Concept Definition, US Army Tank-Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center 
ROS-M: Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities 
• Odroid U3 is payload computer that runs ROS on 
ARSENL swarm architecture 
• Payload’s software components exclusively leverage 
ROS for inter-component communications, 
• Security in ROS is not part of the design 
• Communications/message transmission uses 
publish/subscribe model 
– No authentication (MITM attacks) 




• Authentication of talkers/listeners 
– Registration: challenge-response authentication of 
legitimate components (use certificates) 
– Sending messages: mandatory digital signature 





– use topic-key shared between all talkers/listeners 
– illegitimate talkers cannot produce understandable 
messages 





• Preliminary Stage 
– Understanding ROS and internal dynamics 
• Next few months 
– Study various authentication methods available including 
MAC (message authentication codes) and use of X.509 
certificates 
• Test effectiveness against basic packet interception and injection 
(i.e., man-in-the-middle attack) 
– Study authorization schemes 
• “What are you allowed to do?” 
• The entity requires certain permissions to perform tasks 
– Generate node key pairs 
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Questions? 
